|Title / Titel||Local candidate elections under proportional representation: magic combination or confusing incentives?|
|Abstract (PDF, 14 KB)|
|Summary / Zusammenfassung||Mixed electoral systems are increasingly popular around the world. They allow for the combination of elections in local, single-seat districts by majoritarian electoral rules with a nationwide proportional seat allocation on political parties. If in countries with majoritarian electoral rules, politicians feel pressured to move towards a more proportional electoral system, mixed electoral systems are a genius compromise. They combine elections in small, local districts, with proportional, national elections.
Similarly, other multi-layered electoral systems combine elections at two levels, and according to different institutional logics. The expectations in different kinds of multi-layered electoral systems are high: They should combine different elements, which are usually not compatible: regional representation with a countrywide proportional seat allocation; local representatives with party-based elections. Both lawmakers and academics have therefore discussed some of them as the "best of both worlds" (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001a: 592-6).
This SNF-funded research project, investigates the impact of these systems on strategic behaviour, under particular consideration of the aspect of contamination – i.e. countervailing institutional incentives. Only few studies have considered that the desired effects of multi-layered electoral systems might also spill over to the whole system – and such an effect is not always desirable.
|Publications / Publikationen||Bochsler, D (2009). Are mixed electoral systems the best choice for central and eastern Europe or the reason for defective party systems? Politics and Policy, 37(4):735-767.Bochsler, D (2007). How proportional are mixed compensatory electoral systems? Determining the necessary share of compensation mandates in mixed systems. Symposium: Democracy and Its Development 2005-2011 G07-01, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California.Bochsler, Daniel (2012). A quasi-proportional electoral system ‘only for honest men’? The hidden potential for manipulating mixed compensatory electoral systems. International Political Science Review, 33(4):401-420.|
|Project leadership and contacts /
Projektleitung und Kontakte
|Funding source(s) /
|SNF (Personen- und Projektförderung)
|Duration of Project / Projektdauer||May 2012 to Apr 2015|