Chesney Stromberg Wagner

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Completed research project

Title / Titel Risk-Taking Incentives, Governance, and Losses in the Financial Crisis
PDF Abstract (PDF, 14 KB)
Summary / Zusammenfassung Risk-taking Incentives, Governance, and Losses in the Financial Crisis

This paper studies the extent to which risk-taking incentives of CEOs and other governance
features in a range of years prior to the recent nancial crisis were related to the write-downs of U.S. nancial institutions during the crisis. We document that institutions whose CEOs had particularly strong risk-taking incentives, weak ownership incentives and independent boards had the highest write-downs, both in absolute terms and relative to total assets. Furthermore, nancial institutions with lower Tier-1 ratios and those with CEOs who earned less than their colleagues at comparable rms had larger write-downs.

Keywords: Executive compensation; Subprime crisis; Write-downs; Corporate governance;
Managerial incentives; Risk-taking; Too big to fail
Weitere Informationen
Project leadership and contacts /
Projektleitung und Kontakte
Prof. Marc Chesney (Project Leader)  
Jacob Stromberg (Project Leader)  
Prof. Alexander Wagner (Project Leader)  
Funding source(s) /
Unterstützt durch
Universität Zürich (position pursuing an academic career), Others
Duration of Project / Projektdauer Jan 2010 to Dec 2014