Truth, Judgment and Propositional Attitudes

Summary / Zusammenfassung
Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) is widely seen as the grandfather of modern philosophy of language. Originally, his conception of thought and judgment was directed against psychologism in logic but soon it became more than just a criticism: theories of intentionality and propositional attitudes in contemporary epistemology and in the philosophy of mind make use of the Fregean program in various ways. The present project focuses on the connections between Frege’s theory of truth and his theory of judgment. It will be shown that thoughts are the objects to which truth and falsehood applies. If the performative elements of Frege’s theory of judgment (e.g. act of judging, assertoric force) are taken into consideration as well, one is not committed to Fregean propositions as isolated objects. On the contrary, as will be seen, only a theory of thinking, believing (instead of a theory of thought, belief etc.) can help to uncover the connections between belief, judgment and other propositional attitudes understood as acts and truth. As a further result, it will be shown that the unity of the proposition, as Davidson and others have claimed recently, is a necessary condition for those acts to be directed at or to be about something.

Publications / Publikationen

Keywords / Suchbegriffe
Gottlob Frege, Donald Davidson, belief, thought, judgment, propositional attitudes

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Funding Source(s) / Unterstützt durch
Doctoral dissertation

In Collaboration with / In Zusammenarbeit mit
Prof. Dr. Gabriele Mras, WU Wien  Austria

Duration of Project / Projektdauer
Apr 2007 to Aug 2009